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ARTICLE
CRISPR in context: towards a socially responsible
debate on embryo editing
Michael Morrison 1,3* & Stevienna de Saille2,3*
ABSTRACT Following the birth in 2018 of two babies from embryos altered using CRISPR-
Cas9, human germline gene editing (GGE) moved from abstract concern to reality. He
Jiankui, the scientist responsible, has been roundly condemned by most scientiﬁc, legal and
ethical commentators. However, opinions remain divided on whether GGE could be accep-
tably used in the future, and how, or if it should be prohibited entirely. The many reviews,
summits, positions statements and high-level meetings that have accompanied the emer-
gence of CRISPR technology acknowledge this, calling for greater public engagement to help
reach a consensus on how to proceed. These calls are laudable but far from unproblematic.
Consensus is not only hugely challenging to reach, but difﬁcult to measure and to know when
it might be achieved. Engagement is clearly desirable, but engagement strategies need to
avoid the limitations of previous encounters between publics and biotechnology. Here we set
CRISPR in the context of the biotechnology and fertility industries to illustrate the lessons to
be learned. In particular we demonstrate the importance of avoiding a ‘deﬁcit mode’ in which
resistance is attributed to a lack of public understanding of science, addressing the separation
of technical safety criteria from ethical and social matters, and ensuring the scope of the
debate includes the political-economic context in which science is conducted and new pro-
ducts and services are brought to market. Through this history, we draw on Mary Douglas’
classic anthropological notion of ‘matter out of place’ to explain why biotechnologies evoke
feelings of unease and anxiety, and recommend this as a model for rehabilitating lay
apprehension about novel biological technologies as legitimate matters of concern in future
engagement exercises about GGE.
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Introduction
O
n 25 November 2018, on the eve of a major scientiﬁc
summit in Hong Kong, a Chinese scientist named He
Jiankui made a startling announcement: as a result of
experiments conducted at his clinic, the world’s ﬁrst genetically
edited babies had been born (Regalado, 2018b).
The news was tumultuous and unexpected. Deliberately mak-
ing permanent, heritable changes to the genes of a human embryo
and implanting it with the intent to establish a pregnancy has
long represented a moral boundary, one that is prohibited in a
number of countries, including the US (Araki and Ishii, 2014).
The announcement was unexpected not because the technical
possibility itself was unanticipated—techniques to alter the
genetic material of living cells have been around since the 1970s,
and scientists have long expected they could one day be used for
this purpose—but because human applications have remained
limited due to concerns about safety and efﬁcacy, even as mod-
iﬁcation of bacteria, plants and animals has become routine.
The discovery in 2012 of a system known as CRISPR (Clus-
tered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats) has now
substantially changed the ﬁeld. CRISPR utilises a natural function
of bacteria, which is faster, cheaper and easier to use than earlier
techniques to target and change DNA. Such technologies are
sometimes described as ‘foundational’ or ‘gateway’ because they
have broad application and offer advances over existing practices,
resulting in rapid, far-reaching adoption across a range of sectors
(Feeney et al., 2018). By 2017 papers describing experiments
using CRISPR-Cas9 (Cas9 being a protein ‘scissors’) were triple
those of earlier techniques combined.1
The potential for CRISPR and similar tools to make inheritable
changes to human embryos, known as germline genome editing
(GGE), is particularly challenging to regulate at the global level.
Where human clinical applications of somatic (non-heritable)
genome editing must proceed through a framework of cost-
beneﬁt analysis, clinical trials and regulatory review prior to any
marketing approval (Nicol et al., 2017), germline modiﬁcations
are already being framed as an assisted reproduction technology
(ART). Fertility services, which allow evaluation and selection of
embryos bearing certain characteristics, including pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis and in some countries sex selec-
tion, are already provided through an array of largely private
clinics in countries around the world (Spar, 2006; Whittaker,
2011) and some scientists (including He) have already indicated
interest in opening IVF clinics specialising in embryo editing
(Begley, 2019; Cohen, 2019).
Some jurisdictions, such as the UK, take a ‘strict but permis-
sive’ approach with stringent oversight from a national regulatory
body, in this case the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority (HFEA). At the international level, however, the
institutions, extent, and substance of regulation varies con-
siderably between jurisdictions, depending on their resources,
culture, legal framework, style of government and prevailing
morality (Araki and Ishii, 2014; Roseman et al., 2019). This raises
the very real possibility of GGE being incorporated into the
existing phenomenon of ‘reproductive tourism’ where people
cross national borders in search of assisted reproductive services,
such as surrogacy or the use of anonymous donor gametes, that
are not permitted in their own country (Roseman et al., 2019).
The difﬁculty of regulating untested and unproven medical
interventions at the global scale has also previously been
demonstrated with the growth of the private stem cell treatment
industry (Petersen et al., 2017).
Recognising both the ethical issues and the rapidity with which
the ﬁeld was expanding, two of the scientists on the original
CRISPR discovery team, Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle
Charpentier, published a review paper in Science in which they
concluded that:
The era of straightforward genome editing raises ethical
questions that will need to be addressed by scientists and
society at large. How can we use this powerful tool in such a
way as to ensure maximum beneﬁt while minimising risks?
It will be imperative that nonscientists understand the
basics of this technology sufﬁciently well to facilitate
rational public discourse. Regulatory agencies will also
need to consider how best to foster responsible use of
CRISPR-Cas9 technology without inhibiting appropriate
research and development. (Doudna and Charpentier,
2014, pp. 1258096–7).
He Jiankui’s revelation has added impetus and urgency to these
questions, not so much because of what he did, but when. A
number of prominent scientists have argued that there can be
instances where editing the genome of an embryo may be not
only ethical, but a moral obligation if a child would otherwise be
born with a serious disease (Baltimore et al., 2015). However, He
proceeded with his experiment before any general agreement that
the science or the public were ready for this step. Several pro-
minent CRISPR scientists have now issued calls for a global
moratorium on editing embryos (Lander et al., 2019),2 while
others insist that He’s experiment, although badly done, shows
that GGE is ready to move ahead with more rigorous, ethical
oversight in place (Cohen, 2018), but calls for public dialogue to
‘create a societal consensus’ form the basis of legitimacy for both
sides of the argument (Rosemann et al., 2019). Thus, a number of
critical questions remain unanswered, even unasked.
Although the call for societal engagement is laudable, we argue
it also requires careful examination. Despite the massive press
coverage of He’s announcement, there has so far been no major
public protest about GGE, such as those that accompanied gene
patenting (Parthasarathy, 2017), GM crops in Europe (Jasanoff,
2011) or recent plans to release genetically modiﬁed mosquitos in
Florida (Mole, 2016). Moreover, survey after survey indicates that
people are generally supportive of somatic (i.e., non-reproductive)
genome editing, only somewhat supportive of editing which can
be passed to future generations, and overwhelmingly against
editing for non-medical reasons (see, for example, Hendriks et al.,
2018; Lawton, 2018; Michie and Allyse, 2019; Pew, 2016; Wip-
perman and Campos, 2016). From this, one might even argue that
the public’s consensus position is already clear.
In order to understand why the call for consensus on GGE is
still repeated by prominent scientists, clinicians and academics,
we need to consider CRISPR in context. This means looking at
GGE in light of the history and organisation of biotechnology,
and of assisted reproductive technologies (ART), rather than
viewing the ‘CRISPR babies’ as an isolated aberration. As we shall
discuss, setting GGE in the broader context of biotechnological
innovation reveals serious ﬂaws in simplistic calls for dialogue,
and highlights instead the issues that do need to be the subject of
serious debate, but are rarely discussed: (1) the continued
separation of ‘technical’ issues of safety and efﬁcacy from ‘moral’
issues associated with the technology; (2) lack of attention to the
infrastructure and practices of the for-proﬁt fertility industry
through which embryo editing will potentially be offered to the
public; and (3) an over-simplistic formulation of ‘consensus’. In
the following sections, we will discuss each of these as part of the
history of biotechnology. To clarify our analysis, we will use Mary
Douglas’ concept of ‘matter out of place’ as a lens through which
to understand, and rehabilitate the concerns raised by various
publics about novel biotechnologies, from Dolly the cloned sheep
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to ‘designer babies’. Adapting this stance for future engagement
activities about GGE, we argue, provides a way of avoiding a
narrow separation of safety risks from broader societal concerns,
and reintegrates discussion of science policy and the role of the
private sector as a legitimate part of the public conversation.
A brief history of biotechnology
First generation’ genetic modiﬁcation is an important antecedent
of contemporary genome editing technologies like CRISPR
(Martin et al., 2019). Recombinant DNA (rDNA), in which
sequences of DNA are cut out of, or added to the ‘host’ DNA in
the living cells of an organism, was invented in the early 1970s by
researchers working at Stanford University and the University of
California, San Francisco. Although excited by the possibilities
this new technique opened up, there was also concern about
potential undesirable effects, especially since many of the ﬁrst
organisms to be genetically modiﬁed were bacteria. As an initial
response, a moratorium on further genetic engineering was
voluntarily imposed by the (relatively small number of) scientists
working with rDNA. In 1975, at the now-historic Asilomar
meeting, this temporary ban was replaced with a set of self-
developed guidelines under which scientists felt the ﬁeld could
safely proceed (Baltimore et al., 2015) and which has to some
extent guided all experimentation involving manipulation of
DNA since.
The possibility of using rDNA technology to modify human
genetic material has been part of the conversation, though not
practice, from the beginning. Following an unapproved, and
unsuccessful, attempt in 1980 to treat sickle cell disease using
rDNA (see Beutler, 2001), the US President’s Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research issued a report, ‘Splicing Life’ (1982), which
codiﬁed and popularised two key distinctions that continue to
shape discussions of human genetic modiﬁcation to this day:
treatment of disease versus enhancing normal human char-
acteristics, and making non-inheritable changes to the genome of
individual patients versus making changes to embryos, sperm or
eggs that can be passed on to future offspring—often described
pejoratively in popular accounts as creating ‘designer babies’
(Nerlich, 2017).
While these events were unfolding, research was being carried
out in a number of seemingly unrelated areas that would none-
theless have an important role in eventually making GGE a
practical reality. In 1977, Frederick Sanger and colleagues devel-
oped the technique known as ‘Sanger sequencing’, allowing sci-
entists to better read the sequence of letters (or ‘base pairs) in
DNA. The following year, the birth of Louise Brown in the UK
proved that conception could occur outside the human body,
through the technique of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) developed by
Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe. Together, these events made
the human embryo available for direct experimentation and
provided the beginnings of a toolkit for manipulating its DNA.3
By the early 90s, genetic sequencing had advanced sufﬁciently
to make it feasible, if hugely ambitious, to attempt to sequence a
complete set of human DNA, forming the basis of the interna-
tional Human Genome Project (HGP). The 90s also saw the birth
of Dolly the Sheep, the ﬁrst large mammal to be successfully
cloned; commercialisation of the ﬁrst crops genetically modiﬁed
using rDNA technology; derivation of stem cells from human
embryos; and the ‘ear mouse’, produced by engineering a struc-
ture resembling a human ear on the back of a laboratory mouse.
More recently we have seen the production of ‘admixed’ embryos
containing both human and animal material and mitochondrial
transfer (i.e., combining cytoplasm from one egg with the nucleus
of another) to produce so-called ‘three-parent babies’. These
technologies have been highly controversial in some countries
(Baylis, 2013; Cook-Deegan, 1994; Knoppers et al., 2017; Marris,
2001; Mulkay, 1997) but allowed in others. Pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis (PGD), for example, is particularly contentious
in Germany because of its association with Nazi-era eugenics,
whereas the UK allows admixed embryos, PGD and mitochon-
drial transfer under speciﬁc circumstances, overseen by
the HFEA.
All of these advances have also involved contestation by var-
ious ‘lay’ publics, i.e., people and groups who are neither pro-
fessionally trained in the life sciences nor ofﬁcially charged with
oversight of biotechnologies, such as the staff of regulatory
agencies or members of ethics panels. Even when unsuccessful,
such opposition is, we hold, still signiﬁcant if calls for socially
responsive steering of science and technology are to be taken
seriously. By this, however, we do not mean to suggest there is
some homogeneous ‘general public’ that has a single voice and set
of concerns. Opposition typically comes from a variety of publics,
brought into being around different issues through a variety of
methods, and not necessarily in the same place or at the same
time. These include protests and boycotts, ofﬁcial engagement
events, attitude surveys and televised debates, all of which are
seen as representing a ‘public voice’, yet this is by no means a
uniﬁed voice. In the following sections, we discuss these frictions
as part of the business of science, detailing how previous
encounters affect the context of deployment of CRISPR, the
separation of technical from ethical issues, and place an emphasis
on high-level consensus engagements that are not actually ﬁt for
the purposes of real governance.
The business of science
The constant stream of new biotechnologies that began in the
latter half of the twentieth century is not co-incidental. The era of
biotechnology aligns with a profound shift in the political and
economic landscape of science. National governments, the major
funders of academic science, increasingly look for a return on
their investment of public money in research in the form of new
products and services that can foster national economic growth
(Hessels et al., 2009). Scientiﬁc knowledge is privatised through
intellectual property rights, and companies are commonly ‘spun-
out’ of university departments to exploit knowledge and tech-
nologies developed by their academic scientists. For example,
rDNA was patented in 1974 by the scientists who discovered it
and subsequently licenced by Stanford University to various
commercial developers for a fee, plus a share of royalties from
subsequent products (Feeney et al., 2018). The Bayh-Dole Act of
1980 formalised this approach by incentivising US scientists and
universities to patent and commercialise the products of
government-funded research. A US Supreme Court decision of
the same year, Diamond vs. Chakrabarty, allowed intellectual
property rights to be granted on a living organism. Other nations,
with greater or lesser alacrity, have adopted and adapted this US
approach to science as a source of economic growth and national
competitive advantage (Rajan, 2006). GM plants and animals,
stem cells, genetic tests and processes for creating ‘life itself’ are
all now commercial products, patented and traded by start-up
ﬁrms and multinational companies in a highly lucrative ‘bioec-
onomy’. Nowhere has this shift from publicly funded experiment
to proﬁt-driven sector been more evident than the fertility
industry.
Within a few years of Louise Brown’s birth, in vitro conception
had evolved from an experimental procedure in which few sci-
entists were interested, into a rapidly burgeoning industry
dependent upon aggressive marketing and constant innovation,
the brunt of which is borne by women, upon whose bodies the
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entire process depends (Rowland, 1992). As IVF is a platform
technology, making the human embryo scientiﬁcally accessible
quickly gave rise to associated services such as surrogacy, sex
selection and PGD, which have continued to be controversial,
expensive and unevenly governed on a global basis.
In both the fertility and the larger biotechnology industry,
national policy, which sees science as a source of international
competitiveness, prestige and economic growth, has helped to
foster rapid application of each new discovery. Australia, for
example, funded IVF research with the explicit goal of putting the
country on the international map, and by 1984, the team at
Monash University in Melbourne had overtaken the UK as the
world-leader with a series of other ﬁrsts, including twins, triplets,
babies born from donor eggs and from frozen embryos (Kanne-
giesser, 1988). Thus, national aspirations also act as an engine for
pushing biotechnologies out of the laboratory and into the public
sphere, where they often become controversial because of their
seemingly sudden impact on everyday life, from what we eat to
how we reproduce.
Rapid innovation, particularly through embryo experimenta-
tion, also prompted regulatory responses from a number of
nation states throughout the 1980s. The Warnock Commission
(UK) proposed that research on embryos could be permissible up
to 14 days, but that no embryo that had been altered could be
returned to the womb with the intention of creating a child
(Warnock, 1985). This regulatory model has had such a wide-
spread inﬂuence that “almost every country in which embryo
research is speciﬁcally permitted by regulation, soft or hard,
employs a version of the 14-day rule” (Chan, 2018, p. 228).
The successful early reframing of IVF from ‘experimental’ to
infertility ‘treatment’, even for conditions where infertility is not
the issue (such as artiﬁcial insemination for single women, PGD
for embryo selection, or surrogacy for social reasons) has relied
upon the argument which supports most biomedical innovation:
that it will alleviate human suffering. Moreover, the ﬁeld has
successfully embedded the logics of clinical experimentation, in
which patients have a right to unproven treatments if they and
their doctor think it may confer beneﬁts worth the risks (Baylis,
2013).
While public funding of basic research was essential to devel-
opment of the ﬁeld, private clinics have also existed almost from
the start, including Bourn Hall in the UK, founded by Edwards
and Steptoe in 1980. With most public healthcare systems now
providing only limited access to IVF and related services, a global
market for private assisted reproductive services has emerged,
both in western countries (Spar, 2006; Van Hoof and Pennings,
2011) and increasingly in Asia (Whittaker, 2011). As a result,
what is now more broadly called ‘fertility treatment’ has grown
into a highly lucrative globalised industry where those with the
money to travel can purchase services which are unavailable or
even illegal at home, and innovation takes place in an atmosphere
of secrecy and ﬁerce competition. The recent birth of the Chinese
twins shows that, as with virtually all innovation in assisted
reproduction, experimentation can go unnoticed, even be delib-
erately hidden, until a ‘success’ can be announced.
Separating the technical from the moral. Unease, disquiet and
even disgust at the rapid appearance of biotechnology has been
memorably characterised as the ‘yuck factor’ by philosopher Leon
Kass (1998), who identiﬁes it as part of a ‘wisdom of repugnance’
stemming from a natural human recognition of things that are
ethically dubious. However, other philosophers have viewed this
as an uninformed and thus discountable emotional reaction,
rejecting the idea of the ‘unnatural’ as having any moral validity
(e.g., Kaebnick, 2012). In keeping with this line of thought,
opposition to technology is often characterised by scientists,
policymakers and technology companies as irrational or opposed
to science and progress, a stance closely associated with what has
become known as the ‘deﬁcit model’ of public understanding of
science (Davies, 2006; Marris, 2001; Simis et al., 2016; Wynne,
2001). Put simply, the deﬁcit model posits that public unease
about novel science and technology is a result of poor scientiﬁc
literacy; therefore, educating the public about the science behind
new technologies will foster acceptance.
Governance of science and technology also tends to leave
‘societal’ concerns outside the scope of formal regulatory
oversight (c.f. Levidow and Carr, 1997). For example, the US
Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce has argued it cannot incorporate
consideration of the moral and social aspects of granting
intellectual property rights on living materials into its remit
because this would introduce an unacceptable element of
uncertainty into assessment procedures which must remain
objective (Parthasarathy, 2017). In other instances, societal
concerns may be acknowledged by a regulatory agency but still
considered separately from its technical remit, through public
fora and engagement exercises such as those deployed by the
HFEA during the debates over allowing the creation of admixed
embryos to alleviate the shortage of human ova for stem cell
research (Dyer, 2008). In the European debates over regulation of
GM foods, most engagement occurred after vociferous public
resistance to an approved product, in the hope of creating enough
acceptability (often through attempts to de-legitimise non-
technical concerns) to allow the original agenda to proceed.
Particularly because of the continued European rejection of GM,
‘upstream’ (i.e., research-stage) engagement is now often regarded
as a tool to prevent these kinds of market failure (Marris, 2015).
The equation of non-technical concerns with ethics (Levidow
and Carr, 1997) also means that public debates are often framed
in terms of whether it is morally permissible to undertake a
particular scientiﬁc act, such as destroying an embryo or
changing the genetic make-up of a living organism. This is
perhaps most vividly illustrated in the creation of a separate line
of scholarship about the ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI)
arising from the HGP (Myskja et al., 2014). Combined with the
deﬁcit model, this means exercises are often framed so that
technical assertions cannot be challenged, reinforcing the idea
that objections reﬂect an ill-informed response. Wider discus-
sions about the commercialisation of science, economic aspira-
tions of national governments, and the role of the private sector
in envisaging what future agriculture, medicine and reproductive
health services should look like, are said to be outside the remit of
regulation. Moreover, approaching each novel biotechnology as a
discrete entity precludes adequate consideration of the way
discoveries build on and integrate with one another, so that—as
with designer babies until this year—controversial possibilities for
application can then be dismissed as ‘too far in the future to be
worthy of debate’.
Oversimplifying consensus. Well before He Jiankui’s activities,
genome editing was the subject of a plethora of high-level
meetings, workshops, reports and position statements by groups
ranging from national funding organisations to supranational
political entities and learned societies (The Hinxton Group, 2015;
Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics, 2016; National Academy Of Sci-
ences; National Academy Of Medicine, 2017; Nicol et al., 2017;
Garden and Winickoff, 2018). While these differ in their focus,
e.g., whether they deal exclusively with human applications or
consider genome editing in a variety of organisms, virtually all
reports and statements call for robust public engagement in order
to determine the trajectory of research and eventual applications
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of the technique. However, it remains unclear how any resulting
public consensus should be measured, let alone how it is expected
to be achieved.
Whether by design or serendipity, calls for public consensus
allow science to continue pushing at the moral boundaries already
in place, testing for strengths and weaknesses to see where
pressure may be applied. In part, this is because public
engagement has generally been the task of ELSI scholars, while
the natural scientists and clinicians get on with the work. This is
clearly demonstrated in both the discussions and the division of
expertise in the panels at the Human Gene Summits of 2015 and
2018. However, there is virtually no likelihood that, should
consensus fail to appear, further research and application of
CRISPR to the human germline will not proceed.4 Just as assisted
reproduction has expanded into a cross-border industry where
would-be parents frequently travel in order to obtain reproduc-
tive services that are illegal in their own country, IVF doctors
pursuing controversial innovation also move or open satellite
clinics in jurisdictions that are less restrictive (Rosemann et al.,
2019).5 Because courts tend to rule that preservation of family
bonds, including non-prosecution of parents who break the law,
is in the best interest of the child (Van Hoof and Pennings, 2011),
this has meant almost any prohibited procedure is available
somewhere. Similar dynamics have also been seen with the spread
of stem cell clinics (Petersen et al., 2017) which rests on the
patient’s perceived ‘right to try’ even risky, unproven procedures.
Ultimately, there is a real danger that the stand-in for ‘public
consensus’ will simply be that some people are willing to go
anywhere and pay any price to have what they want.
To be meaningful and useful, public debate must therefore
move beyond the goal of consensus, which implicitly suggests that
there is a single voice, or agreement on how to move forward, that
can and must be found. Taking public concerns seriously (that is,
as rational and legitimate) also means recognising that there are
multiple publics and indeed multiple rationalities, and that debate
over any particular biotechnology will almost certainly play out
differently in different contexts. If consensus means that every-
one, or at least the vast majority of people, must agree that a
technology is acceptable, then true consensus is very rarely if ever
achieved at a societal level—never mind on a global scale. If
debates about using CRISPR to create genetically modify human
embryos are to avoid simply repeating the same arguments which
have existed since the 1970s, then new approaches are needed
that go beyond the polarised notion of rational science versus
irrational ignorance, and technical versus moral concerns. This
means opening up debates involving both lay people and
scientists to include discussion of the context—including the
economic and regulatory context(s)—in which GGE will be
deployed. Achieving this is not simply a matter of doing ‘better’
engagement—at least not without a discussion of what ‘better’
might mean. In the next section, we present an alternative
approach to understanding public concerns with biotechnologies,
with a view to informing our recommendations on the future of
germline genome editing debates.
Biotechnology, hybridity and matter out of place
In her now-classic anthropological study, Purity and Danger,
Mary Douglas (1966 [2001]) set out to explore why some objects,
behaviours, or situations are considered ‘clean’ or ‘pure’ while
others are regarded as ‘dirty’, ‘polluting’ or ‘contaminating’. One
of her key ﬁndings was that there is rarely any universal substance
or action that is considered ‘dirty’, but what almost all societies
think of as ‘dirt’ is something that is not where it is supposed to be,
i.e., it is ‘matter out of place’. Boundaries and categories, whether
formal and ofﬁcial or tacit and unspoken, produce order, the
sense of how things are supposed to be, but what is applicable in
one context may cease to make sense, may even be offensive,
when transposed to another. This can be illustrated with a simple
example: soil found in a ﬂowerbed is not dirt. That is where we
expect it to be. However, the same soil on the kitchen ﬂoor is
considered dirt and the normal response is to clean it up. It is not
that ‘soil’ is never or always ‘dirt’; rather it depends on the context
and on our prior expectations of where soil ought and ought
not to be.
Although Douglas’ work primarily explored beliefs and prac-
tices of ritual pollution in tribal societies, the underlying
anthropological understanding is equally applicable to modern
cultures. Thus, it helps us see how investigation of the plasticity
(or malleability) of life, which has proved so productive and
useful in the laboratory, also challenges categories and distinc-
tions that have meaning and are important in everyday life out-
side the laboratory.
Categories and distinctions—for example between soil and dirt,
animal and human, or between the embryo in the body and the
embryo in the dish, deﬁne what we think of as ‘normal’, ‘proper’,
and ‘expected’, to the extent that we rarely recognise that they
result from particular judgements and assumptions until they are
in some way challenged. Things, situations or actions that cross
boundaries or appear to simultaneously belong to distinct
oppositional categories (hybrids) become viewed as ‘dirty’, ‘dan-
gerous’, ‘unnatural’, ‘monstrous’ or ‘impure’. Each of these
accusations evokes a sense of some sort of order being trans-
gressed, whether that order is imposed by nature, divine ﬁat or
aesthetic and moral sensibilities. Cell culture, for example, pro-
blematizes the boundary between what is alive and what is dead
or inert. Consider Henrietta Lacks, who died many years ago but
whose cancer cells, in the form of the immortalised HeLa cell line,
are still alive and growing in many laboratories round the world
(Skloot, 2011). Reproductive cloning, mitochondrial and gamete
‘donation’ and surrogacy all challenge conventional ideas of
family relations in terms of who counts as a parent or a sibling.
Reproductive cloning also blurs distinctions as it makes a new
person whose genome replicates someone already living, or per-
haps already dead (the difference in age typically distinguishing
cloning from ordinary twins). Genetic modiﬁcation of human
embryos using genome editing produces a similarly troubling
hybrid: the CRISPR babies are both ‘natural’ given persons and
engineered ‘objects’ of laboratory science, both who and not who
they were originally ‘intended’ to be. Thus, hybrid biotechnolo-
gies appear to pose a threat to the shared meanings, values and
rules of conduct that make communal social living and organi-
sation possible. Part of what constitutes the yuck or fear response
to these technologies, we argue, is a shared (though often tacit)
sense that matter has somehow been shifted out of its ‘correct’ or
natural place.
The hybrid-generating power of the life sciences is rarely
experienced by the scientists themselves as unnatural or dis-
turbing because the techniques they use have long since been
normalised within the ﬁeld. This perspective is the result of years
of training to seek knowledge in a particular manner, encom-
passing both ontology (what kinds of objects genes, cells,
embryos, etc. are), and epistemology (how they should best be
studied and how experiments should be designed). The array of
practical tools and techniques for manipulating cells, genes,
proteins and other elements of living systems are learnt, along
with the cognitive stance that makes sense of them, through the
process of training from undergraduate to post-graduate to
postdoctoral to senior scientist. This combination of a particular
way of looking at the world and a set of techniques for producing
knowledge based on that perspective is what Karin Knorr-Cetina
(1999) described as the peculiar ‘epistemic culture’ of a discipline.
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As Douglas (1966, p. 45) notes, “our pollution behaviour is the
reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or
contradict cherished classiﬁcation”. It is, therefore, culturally
speciﬁc, but contemporary societies are much more hetero-
geneous and fragmented than tribal groups or the epistemic
cultures of scientiﬁc disciplines. Accordingly, there is often a
range of different responses and attitudes to novel biotechnolo-
gies within any given population, some of which are voiced more
loudly than others. Different forms of pollution may produce a
similar result, despite different cultural or epistemic rationales, or
vice versa. For example, while religious groups may object to
embryo experimentation because it pollutes the embryo, feminists
might object to the pollution of women’s bodies, because the
arduous process of egg extraction means women are being asked
to bear unnecessary medical risks purely to advance science and
scientists’ careers (see e.g., Waldby, 2008; Baylis, 2013). Thus,
while both groups might oppose creating embryos for stem cell
research, it would be for very different reasons and require dif-
ferent ‘rituals of puriﬁcation’.
The designation of a thing, event, deed, or person as ‘dirty’ and
‘out of place’ is rarely an unalterable verdict as “most pollutions
have a very simple remedy for undoing their effects. There are
rites of reversing, untying, burying, washing, erasing, fumigating,
and so on” (Douglas, 1966, p. 168). Just as ‘matter out of place’
can be a cultural and symbolic judgement rather than a literal
material one, so too can acts of puriﬁcation operate as symbolic
restitution, rebalancing the social order rather than ﬁxing a
physical problem. In contemporary societies, a public engagement
exercise that is perceived as meaningful might act as a suitable
‘rite of puriﬁcation’. It is publicly enacted, so its message would be
transmitted to the wider society, and its procedures must sym-
bolise some form of democratic accountability and legitimacy
sufﬁcient to dispel lingering doubts about the danger of a ‘messy’
new hybrid technology. Similarly, in the widespread condemna-
tion of He Jiankui’s GGE experiment by scientiﬁc authorities and
bioethicists we can see an attempt at purifying human GGE
research by designating Jiankui as a ‘rogue’ scientist, symbolically
expelling him from the global community working on the topic,
and distancing his ‘dirty’ work from the ‘pure’ realm of legitimate
science (e.g., Regalado, 2018c; Harper, 2018; Belluck, 2019).
At the same time, the infrastructure and practices of the bio-
technology industry have become increasingly universal as more
countries compete to enter the global market. Intellectual prop-
erty regimes now apply to living organisms and their components
(such as genes, cells and proteins), with material from plants,
animals, and even people with particular characteristics extracted
and invested in as sources of ‘biovalue’, while biotech start-ups
commercialise novel discoveries through speculative investment
and academic scientists increasingly act as entrepreneurs (Rajan,
2006; Waldby and Mitchell, 2006). The sense of matter out of
place can be very strong here as most cultures have not histori-
cally considered these kinds of biological material as a resource
which can be patented and sold, particularly in a way that allows
others to proﬁt from our bodies in ways we cannot, as in the case
of Henrietta Lacks’ cancerous cells.
Thus the infrastructure of the biotechnology and fertility
industries pushes matter across normative boundaries between
private and public property, between publicly funded academic
science and for-proﬁt industry, between the body and the patent
ofﬁce, and between pure science—investigating what something is
or how it works—and forms of applied science which are meant
to see what things can be made to do. As Smits (2006, also fol-
lowing Douglas) has observed, hybrid entities are often seen as
‘monstrous’ in that they simultaneously and inextricably arouse
both fear and fascination (see also de Saille and Martin, 2018).
This makes highly visible biotechnologies like Dolly the Sheep or
the ‘designer baby’ a focus for airing broader concerns about
purity and impurity in the scientiﬁc endeavour that may other-
wise fail to ﬁnd an outlet. The outpouring of scientiﬁc con-
demnation for He’s GGE procedure, although intended to ‘purify’
the ﬁeld of genome editing, also served to reopen discussion
about the moral appropriateness of the incentive structures in
modern science, including the prestige associated with being the
ﬁrst to make each advance and the pressure to commercialise
research. Ultimately, each new symbol of biotechnology evokes
culturally speciﬁc reactions and simultaneously becomes a new
instance to reﬁght old battles.
Applying the ‘matter out of place’ approach to GGE means
that, rather than accepting the charge that expressions of disgust,
monstrosity or unnaturalness are evidence of irrational fear and
ignorance in public debates, we should actively look for what is
being designated as ‘dirt’ by different speakers and different
constituencies, and what kinds of puriﬁcation rituals are being
called into play. This in turn reframes GGE not as an abstract
ethical question about the moral boundary of a particularly
technology, but as a systemic question about the wider context of
existing social structures, and the kinds of checks, incentives and
rituals which will be needed to keep it—and indeed whether it is
even possible to keep it—‘clean’.
At the beginning of this paper, we noted that it was not just a
matter of what He did, but when. He’s experiment invited con-
demnation on a number of what grounds: that there are better
treatments to prevent HIV transmission, that his consenting
procedure was highly unethical, and that his own tests showed the
edits were de novo mutations that would be ineffective to prevent
HIV in one, perhaps both embryos, so there was no scientiﬁcally
supportable reason to continue. These arguments would be
enough to designate the experiment ‘dirty’, even if GGE was legal
and accepted. But perhaps more important, He contravened what
might be the most important cleanliness taboo because it is the
only one approaching unanimous agreement by all parties in the
ﬁeld: that GGE is not safe enough to be used yet. This could be
seen in arguments that the experiments were premature, and
could damage the legitimacy of the ﬁeld. However, He could also
be seen as polluting the sacred ritual of public consensus seeking
by the timing of the announcement, which effectively hijacked the
carefully curated agenda of the second Human Gene Summit,
turning it instead into a media circus which—as feared from the
start—forced the entire ﬁeld into a defensive position from which
it is still trying to emerge.
CRISPR in context-towards a socially responsive debate on
embryo editing?
CRISPR excites scientists and clinicians because it opens new
possibilities for research and innovation, but mindful of past
controversies, they also worry that a public backlash against
germline genome editing could threaten both somatic (i.e., non-
reproducing) genome editing and embryo research in general.
This fear of a public backlash shapes the ﬁeld in particular ways;
even those who champion GGE for human enhancement are
enjoined to limit the scope of their research to what is within their
so-called social licence to operate.6 Calls not to operate before
there is public consensus are a key part of this protective strategy.
Thus, condemnation of He Jiankui was a necessary part of
‘purifying’ a polluted ﬁeld.
Let us be clear that we are not arguing against dialogue and
engagement. Our concern is that, if dialogue is to be meaningful,
it must have a different purpose, as ‘consensus’ already appears to
exist insofar as survey instruments show that public opinion is
broadly similar across time and place. We offer instead the idea of
‘matter out of place’ as a way of working through the three main
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lacunae identiﬁed in discussions about novel biotechnologies: (1)
persistence of a deﬁcit model framing that presents lay opposition
as resulting from irrationality, fear and/or ignorance; (2)
separation into technical criteria to be assessed by scientiﬁc
experts, and moral concerns to be addressed by ELSI scholars and
public engagement exercises and (3) discussion of each new
technology as a separate ‘ethical’ issue with little or no con-
sideration of the context within which science in general and
assisted reproduction in particular is organised, funded and
commercialised. These elements are best considered as acting
cumulatively, with each reinforcing the other.
In the preceding sections, we have tried to situate CRISPR in its
context as a new biotechnology, but one which does not represent
a signiﬁcant departure from the trajectory of the ﬁeld. Rather, the
birth of two genetically edited children is the long-expected, yet
still seemingly premature, culmination of experiments aimed at
manipulating DNA which began in the 1970s. The history of the
life sciences (especially molecular biology) is one of progressively
investigating the malleability of life, so that for its practitioners
moving, mixing and mutating its elements has become a perfectly
normal, acceptable way of producing knowledge. However, these
manipulations also transgress boundaries that are meaningful and
signiﬁcant in everyday life: alive/dead, old/young, human/animal/
plant, etc. This may not matter when scientiﬁc research remains
‘behind the scenes’ in the laboratory, unless it involves things that
already have a special social status, such as human embryos.
However, the contemporary emphasis on the life sciences as a
source of economic growth and national prestige, combined with
a ‘translational imperative’ which regards the overriding purpose
of academic research as the generation of new products and
services, serves to accelerate both the volume of hybrid entities
being produced and the speed at which they move ‘front stage’
into the public gaze.
As with the muddy road from IVF to human cloning to
mitochondrial donation, sustaining boundaries between ther-
apeutic and reproductive applications may be more difﬁcult than
might be hoped. While the boundary between somatic and
germline editing is reinforced through the Human Gene Summits
and other such discussions, the context in which those boundaries
have been constructed (and will likely be dismantled) is not
discussed. Whether one approves of GGE or not, it must be noted
that He Jiankui already considered it as a ‘therapeutic assisted
reproductive technology’ (He et al., 2018), and there are already
IVF clinics eager to learn his technique (Begley, 2019). In such a
highly competitive industry, history has already shown us that
once one clinic innovates, the sector will shortly follow.
There is, therefore, a real danger that the lack of public protest
over He’s announcement will be taken for public consensus to
proceed. To some extent, this lack may have been an artefact of a
particular political moment in which other things—climate
change, far-right extremism and an unstable White House—were
dominating both news cycles and the public mind, exhausting the
capacity to worry about two children born through some obscure
technology in China. However, it can also be seen as a reﬂection
of previous battles over biotechnological innovation, a kind of
weariness stemming from the public’s sense that we have been
here many times before and there is little to be said that is new.
Rather than a social license to operate, this indicates a not entirely
unfounded pessimism that whatever objections might be raised,
the science will continue, as has been the case with embryonic
stem cells or GMOs.
We see this weariness as the inevitable result of a deﬁcit
approach which frames rational science as struggling against an
ignorant public. One reason this practice continues is because it
privileges scientiﬁc expertise and the scientiﬁc worldview as the
starting point for being able to have any valid say in these
discussions (Jasanoff, 2011). This allows those with technical
expertise to remain on familiar, quantiﬁable ground in which
science is a value-free account based on reason and evidence
alone, and avoid questions which are non-quantiﬁable and out-
side their narrow expertise. This dualistic stance actively favours
the silo approach, where scientiﬁc research is permitted to con-
tinue unimpeded with the justiﬁcation of amassing the data
needed to satisfy objective regulatory criteria for safety and efﬁ-
cacy, while non-technical societal concerns are dealt with sepa-
rately as subjective matters that cannot be adjudicated by
evidence. Within this context, potential harms can only be con-
sidered as issues of safety and efﬁcacy, while contextual factors
such as facilitating markets, distribution of beneﬁts and risks, and
complexities of global governance are bracketed out. Thus, the
debate narrows down to the moral permissibility of a scientiﬁc
procedure in the abstract, so that ‘to alleviate human suffering’
becomes a moral trump card, an unassailable justiﬁcation for
proceeding, regardless of whether human suffering is being cre-
ated at the same time.
We ﬁnd this approach unsatisfactory for a number of reasons.
First, the deﬁcit model privileges expert deﬁnitions of the pro-
blem and of what is at stake over those of lay publics who
nevertheless have to live with the consequences. The separation of
‘ethical’ and ‘technical’ aspects precludes meaningful discussion
of the social contexts in which technologies are developed and
made available. Consequently, the interests of states and tech-
nology developers are prioritised over those of the people and
communities affected by the implementation of new technologies,
in ways that lack democratic legitimacy and may inhibit socially
responsible innovation. Further, debates on effective governance
solutions tend to remain the preserve of technical experts who
may not have sufﬁcient information to see the bigger picture.
We initially introduced ‘matter out of place’ as a way of seeing
lay concerns about new technologies as rational, understandable,
socially responsive reactions to the hybrid nature of many bio-
technologies. However, like the technologies in question, publics
also appear to simultaneously elicit both fear and fascination for
the scientists who must ultimately justify their research in order
to ensure their social license to operate. While publics worry
about risks both expected and unforeseen, scientists also worry
that engagement exercises can risk uncovering serious negative
responses, or that ‘unruly’ publics may turn confrontational and
begin to actively resist, as in the case of GMOs. Thus, although
the agency of publics in technical decision-making may be limited
and reactive, it is not non-existent. We propose further extending
the idea of ‘matter out of place’ to bring this context—especially
the context(s) under which science is produced, new technologies
are made available, and people make choices based on their own
needs and desires—back into public debates about GGE. This
shows us that publics themselves are often treated as ‘matter out
of place’ in scientiﬁc engagement exercises, subjected to a variety
of rituals to ensure they are ‘clean’, such as pre-screening focus
groups to weed out those with existing or unfavourable opinions,
limiting responses in written consultations to technical issues
only, or requiring that audience questions at expert panels be
submitted to a moderator, who then chooses which will be
answered. This erodes both democratic legitimacy and trust
(Marris, 2015; Wynne, 2001).
Second, we do not believe it is appropriate for public approval
to be measured by take-up through the market. This cannot stand
in for social licence to operate because the latter requires a col-
lective, rather than individualist, view which must consider what
will happen if the technology is taken up in aggregate. Many
technologies cause little harm when only a few use them, but have
substantially different effects once they become ubiquitous. If, for
example, it becomes a moral obligation to edit all of our embryos
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to make the “best possible babies”, as Savulescu (2007) and others
have suggested, that would also require all women who want
children to undergo IVF, a context which is not mentioned.
Third, as long as the goal of achieving public consensus remains
a priority for many policy makers and scientiﬁc authorities
(Rosemann et al., 2019), our (modest) recommendation is that
these must engage robustly with what is meant by ‘consensus’ and
how we will know that it has been achieved. It also means
recognising generic, recurring concerns about the nature of the
biotechnology industry and understanding these as not wholly
separable from concerns speciﬁc to a particular technology. Rather
than consensus about acceptable and unacceptable uses of tech-
nology in the abstract, we suggest the aim of engagement should
be to try to ﬁnd new and alternative ways of interrogating the
context of technological deployment as much as the technology
itself. Adopting a ‘matter out of place’ approach directs attention
to how GGE’s speciﬁc inseparable but incommensurate categories
might be pointing to a genuine threat to values, meanings, ways of
life, and hopes for the future, as well as traditional scientiﬁc
understandings of harm, and consider opposition as rituals of
puriﬁcation and/or containment which have a rational purpose.
This includes debates on the acceptability of commercial delivery
of GGE through private clinics, the possibility of reproductive
tourism, and the way contemporary science is incentivised. This,
as we have argued, is not aimed at producing consensus, but at
making debates about GGE more sensitive to the variety of per-
spectives and concerns (as well as hopes) it calls forth. Ultimately,
‘matter out of context’ is not a panacea for all issues of responsible
research and innovation in GGE—a wicked problem with no easy
solutions if ever there was one—but we believe it can provide a
more useful way of framing an equitable public debate.
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Notes
1 Elsevier (2017) Gene Editing Research. https://www.elsevier.com/research-intelligence/
campaigns/crispr.
2 Including Feng Zhang of the Broad Institute, who holds the patent He licensed for his
work (Regalado, 2018a).
3 Robert Edwards himself was acutely aware of this potential (see Edwards and Glass
1976).
4 Indeed, as we were writing this article, a Russian scientist claimed he would replicate
He’s CCR5 experiment because he was ‘crazy enough’ to try (Cyranoski, 2019). Then,
after widespread condemnation, he decided to edit for deafness instead (Le Page,
2019).
5 John Zhang, the IVF doctor trying to commercialise nuclear spindle transfer (a form of
mitochondrial donation) for older women, is explicit about this: the embryos are made
in his New York lab but are implanted in his satellite clinic in Mexico because this is
illegal in the US. Designer babies are his declared next step (Mullin, 2017), having
discussed the ‘potential’ of setting up a clinic in China with He in the summer of 2018
(Cohen, 2019).
6 However, this does not seem to stop clinics from promising ‘better babies’ by pre-
advertising PGD-related services which do not yet exist, such as selecting embryos for
intelligence (Devlin, 2019).
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